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fMRIgaze cues on learning and decision-making, we acquired behavioural and fMRI data from
50 participants performing a probabilistic task, in which cards with varying winning
probabilities had to be chosen. In addition, the task included a computer-generated face
that gazed towards one of these cards providing implicit advice. Participants’ individual
belief trajectories were inferred using a hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF) and used as
predictors in a linear model of neuronal activation. During learning, social prediction errors
were correlated with activity in inferior frontal gyrus and insula. During decision-making,
the belief about the accuracy of the social cue was correlated with activity in inferior
temporal gyrus, putamen and pallidum while the putamen and insula showed activity as a
function of individual differences in weighting the social cue during decision-making. Our
findings demonstrate that model-based fMRI can give insight into the behavioural and
neural aspects of spontaneous social cue integration in learning and decision-making.
They provide evidence for a mechanistic involvement of specific components of the
basal ganglia in subserving these processes.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Successful social interaction requires learning from others
and making decisions that in turn lead to rewarding experi-
ences. Although similar to reward learning in non-social
contexts, social learning is thought to engage different pro-
cesses by which not only reward associations are learned, but
also the hidden traits (Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015) or states
(e.g., intentions) (Diaconescu et al., 2017) whichmaymodulate
these associations. Accordingly, social learning has been
found to engage brain regions that may have a unique role in
social cognition in addition to the neural circuitry involved in
non-social learning (Joiner, Piva, Turrin, & Chang, 2017;
Lockwood & Klein-Flügge, 2020; Ruff & Fehr, 2014;
Wittmann, Lockwood, & Rushworth, 2018).
Reinforcement learning studies have repeatedly found that
striatal activity is associated with non-social reward predic-
tion errors, i.e., the difference between actual and expected
reward (cf. Dayan & Daw, 2008; O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli,
2017), but also reward prediction errors in various social
contexts (e.g., Baez-Mendoza & Schultz, 2013; Burke, Tobler,
Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015;
Lockwood, Apps, Valton, Viding, & Roiser, 2016; Lockwood &
Klein-Flügge, 2020). For instance, in trust games in which
participants are required to make risky investments with
other players, parts of the striatum including the caudate and
putamen show stronger activations in response to recipro-
cated cooperation (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Fareri,
Chang, & Delgado, 2012; King-Casas et al., 2005). Activity in
these regions is also associated with reward predictions about
others during trust decisions (Diaconescu et al., 2017; King-
Casas et al., 2005). Negative violations of social reward, such
as unreciprocated cooperation (Rilling, King-Casas, & Sanfey,
2008), misleading advice (Diaconescu et al., 2017) and social
exclusion (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003) have
been associated with activity in the insula, which is also
involved in risk and error monitoring in non-social contexts
(cf. Iglesias, Mathys, Brodersen, Kasper, Piccirelli, denOuden,
et al., 2013).In addition, some brain regions may be more strongly
involved in social learning than in non-social learning. For
instance, paradigms in which participants were asked to learn
about the trustworthiness of a partner through trial and error
(Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Diaconescu
et al., 2017; King-Casas et al., 2005) have been used to show
that social prediction errors engage brain areas previously
associated with mentalization, such as the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC).
Other studies highlighted the domain specificity of the ante-
rior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) when learning from others (Apps,
Lesage, & Ramnani, 2015; Apps, Rushworth, & Chang, 2016;
Lockwood, Apps, Roiser, & Viding, 2015).
The majority of studies, which investigated the neural
correlates of learning the trustworthiness of others, thereby
probing mentalization, instructed participants explicitly to
learn from a partner’s advice (Behrens et al., 2008; Diaconescu
et al., 2017). Most everyday life social interactions, however,
require us to automatically infer on mental states by using
nonverbal signals such as gaze behaviour (Schilbach et al.,
2013). Therefore, in the current study, we decided to investi-
gate the neural mechanisms of uninstructed social learning
and decision-making by means of functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI).
To this end, we employed an established probabilistic
learning task (Sevgi, Diaconescu, Henco, Tittgemeyer, &
Schilbach, 2020) in which participants can learn from two
types of information, i.e., a non-social cue (cards with
different colours) and a social cue (gaze shift of a face pre-
sented in the centre of the screen), in order to maximize the
reward associated with a card draw (Fig. 1A). In this task,
participants were not explicitly instructed to pay attention to
the face in order to probe the spontaneous use of social in-
formation. Three types of computational models of learning
and decision-making were used to fit participants’ choices.
Thesemodels varied in their complexity of the belief updating
process and have been employed in previous studies of
learning under uncertainty (DeBerker et al., 2016; Iglesias,
Mathys, Brodersen, Kasper, Piccirelli, denOuden, et al., 2013).
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such a way that it allowed us to estimate the relative weight
participants were affording to their learned beliefs about the
social cue compared to the non-social cuewhen predicting the
outcome of the task. We also captured the usage of the social
cue by means of model-agnostic measures, i.e., subjective
post-experimental reports as well as gaze fixations during
decision-making by means of simultaneous eye-tracking.
The learning trajectories as well as the weighting factor
from the best performing model, the hierarchical Gaussian
filter (HGF; Mathys et al., 2014; Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, &
Stephan, 2011), were used as predictors in model-based fMRI
analysis to uncover the neural mechanisms of social and non-
social learning and decision-making. We evaluated whether
social learning signals during uninstructed inference would
yield neural activations similar to those found in studies of
instructed inference (Behrens et al., 2008; Diaconescu et al.,
2017). This allowed us to evaluate whether inter-individual
variation in the propensity to use the social cue during
decision-making is reflected in differences of neural activity.
We expected the striatum to be involved in the representation
of social cue probabilities and were specifically interested in
investigating whether individual differences in weighting the
social over non-social information in the task were also rep-
resented in this part of the brain. We further evaluated the
estimated uncertainty for social and non-social cues during
decision-making. We predicted that the insula would code
both social and non-social uncertainty and asked whether
social uncertainty is additionally tracked by regions involved
in mentalization. Furthermore, we probed the neural corre-
lates of social and non-social prediction errors and predicted
to find overlapping activations in the anterior cingulate and
insula as well as activations associated with social learning in
brain regions involved in mentalizing, such as the TPJ and the
dmPFC (Behrens et al., 2008; Diaconescu et al., 2017).2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 55 healthy volunteers (28 female;mean age 25.2 ± 5.6
years, range: 18e48 years) participated in the study. These
participants were recruited through the Max Planck Institute
of Psychiatry as well as local universities. They were all right-
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and re-
ported no history of neurological or psychiatric disease.
Furthermore, they did not meet any contraindications for
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) measurement, such as
metal implants or claustrophobia. All participants stated to be
non-smokers and none of them reported current intake of
psychoactive medication. All participants were naı̈ve to the
purpose of the experiment and provided informed consent to
take part in the study after a written/verbal explanation of the
study procedure. Participants received a reimbursement for
participation and an additional amount of money (1e6 Euro)
that depended on their score in the task. The studywas in line
with the Declaration of Helsinki and approval for the experi-
mental protocol was granted by the local ethics committee of
the Medical Faculty of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University ofMunich. Five measured participants were not included in the
analysis: two were excluded due to abnormalities in the
structural brain scans, one due to technical issues with the
task presentation on the scanner monitor, one participant did
not perform the task according to the instruction, and one
participant was excluded because an exclusion criterion
(nicotine abuse) applied, which was communicated subse-
quent to measurement. Accordingly, we analysed data from
50 participants (25 female; mean age 24.8 ± 5 years, range:
18e48 years).
2.2. Experimental paradigm and procedure
Participants completed a probabilistic learning task,
comprising a non-social and a social cue (Fig. 1A). The task,
initially introduced by (Sevgi et al., 2020), consisted of 120
trials and lasted approximately 20 min. Participants were
instructed to choose one of two cards (green or blue) on every
trial and were told that the winning probability of the colours
would change throughout the task. A computer-generated
face was presented at the centre of the screen during the
entire trial. At the trial start, the face looked down, then raised
its eyes to look directly at the participant, and then shifted its
gaze towards one of two cards presented on either side of it
(Fig. 1A). Independently of the winning probability of the card
colours, the probability of the face gazing towards thewinning
card, thus providing a social cue, was also systematically
manipulated. Participant choice was enabled two seconds
after the gaze shift of the face and lasted until a response was
made. Trials were not counted if the participant pressed a
button before the choicewas enabled or if they tookmore than
5 sec to respond after the choice was activated. In these cases,
the screen showed “response too early/late” and the outcome
of the choice was not displayed. The choice phase was fol-
lowed by a jittered delay (2e4 sec) before the outcome (correct/
wrong) was presented for 2 sec. During choice, both cards
were showing reward values (ranging from 1 to 9), which were
added to a cumulative score that was presented during the
feedback phase if the participant chose the correct card.When
the answer was wrong, the score remained the same. Partic-
ipants were told that the numbers were sampled randomly
and that they were not associated with the winning proba-
bilities of the cards. Participants were told that if they were
completely uncertain about the winning probabilities, they
might want to pick the card associated with a higher reward
value. The outcomewas signalled to the participant by a green
check mark (correct choice) or a red cross (incorrect choice).
All trials were separated by a jittered inter-trial interval
(3e6 sec) and 12 of these inter-trial intervals were jittered at
longer durations (12e15 sec), similar to including null trials.
Prior to the task, participants were informed that the card
winning probabilities would change during the task. Partici-
pants were not explicitly instructed to learn about the social
cue, but were merely told that the face in the centre of the
screen was included to make the task more interesting. The
probability schedule of the social cue was orthogonal to the
non-social cue as shown in Fig. 1B. During the first half of the
experiment, the winning probability of the blue card was
stable at 75% (trials 1e60), followed by a volatile period where
winning probability changed from 20% (trials 61e80; 101e120)
Fig. 1 e A: Trial flow and task design. On every trial, participants choose one of two cards (green & blue). After the choice is
logged, an hourglass is presented followed by a green tick or a red cross depending on whether the response was correct or
wrong. With every correct response, the score of the chosen card is added onto a cumulative score that participants were
instructed to maximize and which determined the additional amount (1e6 euro) paid to the participant at the end of the
experiment. B: Probability schedule of the social (blue) and non-social (red) cue. C: Two parallel learning systems that
describe participants’ learning about the probability and volatility of the social (blue) and non-social (red) cues. The circles
(blue and red) and the diamond (purple) represent states that change in time (i.e., trial t), whereas the squares denote
parameters estimated across time (see Methods 2.3).
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phase with 75% accuracy (trials 1e40), followed by a volatile
period where gaze accuracy changed from 20% (trials 41e50;
61e70) and 80% (trials 51e60; 71e80). During trials 80e120 the
gaze accuracy had a probability of 12%. For 8 participants, who
were recruited during the pilot phase of the study, the volatile
phase of the social cue started 10 trials later. The paradigm
was presented by Presentation software (Presentation Version
16.3, Build 12.20.12, Neurobehavioural Systems Inc., Berkeley,
California, USA, www.neurobs.com) running on a Microsoft
WindowXP operating system and stimuli were presented on a
30-inch LCD OptoStimH-3/30Medres MRI compatible monitor
on a background of grey luminance with a resolution of
1024  768 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants responded
to Stimuli using two buttons on a response box (LSC-400B
controller, Lumina, Cedrus).
Prior to the MRI session, participants were asked to answer
a standard set of questionnaires used in the research group. It
included the autism quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) emotional quotient (EQ;
Anticipatory and Consummatory Interpersonal Pleasure Scale
(ACIPS; Gooding & Pflum, 2014), Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale
(LSAS; (Liebowitz, 1987), the Becks Depression Inventory (BDI-
II; Kühner, Bürger, Keller, & Hautzinger, 2006), the Social
Network Questionnaire (SNQ; Linden, Lischka, Popien, &
Golombek, 2007), the Toronto Alexythimia Scale (TAS; Bagby,
Taylor, & Parker, 1994) as well as the Reading the Mind in theEyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, &
Plumb, 2001). The psychometric data was analysed within
the scope of a different study. In addition, participants filled
out a post-experimental questionnaire to assess the subjective
learning experience during the task, asking how difficult the
task was (from 0 to 100), how much they used the gaze (from
0 to 100) and how much it helped them during the task (from
0 to 100). The results of the post-experimental questionnaire
can be seen in the appendix (Table A. 1).
2.3. Computational modelling
The modelling approach followed the “observing the
observer” framework in which two types of models (percep-
tual and response models) are paired in order to allow the
inference of an observer (i.e., the experimenter) on the infer-
ence of a participant: Perceptual models describe the partic-
ipant’s belief trajectories about the hidden causes (states) of
the sensory inputs (here: social and non-social cue); the
response models describe how these beliefs are translated
into decisions (Daunizeau et al., 2010).
2.3.1. Perceptual models
We used 3 perceptual models that had been employed in
previous studies (cf. Iglesias, Mathys, Brodersen, Kasper,
Piccirelli, denOuden, et al., 2013) and that varied with regard
to the complexity of the belief updating process. Perceptual
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(HGF; Mathys et al., 2014; Mathys et al., 2011), which are in-
versions of generative models of the sensory inputs the
participant experiences, i.e., card and gaze outcomes (Fig. 2).
This approach assumes that participants are dynamically
updating their beliefs (i.e., posterior probability distributions)
in order to infer on the hidden environmental states x that
cause the experienced sensory inputs. In the generative
model, these “to-be-inferred-on” states are coupled in a three-
level hierarchy: The lowest level x1 gaze represents the accu-
racy of the gaze in a binary form (1 ¼ correct, 0 ¼ incorrect),
level x2 gaze represents the tendency of the gaze to be correct or
incorrect and level x3 gaze represents the volatility of this ten-
dency to be accurate. Correspondingly, the lowest level x1card
represents the accuracy of the blue card in a binary form
(1¼ correct, 0¼ incorrect), level x2 card represents the tendency
of the blue card to be correct or incorrect and level x3 card
represents the volatility of the tendency of the blue card to be
correct. The third state evolves as a first-order autoregressive
(AR(1)) process. The second state evolves as a Gaussian
random walk with a step size determined by the state at the
third level. The probability of x1is a sigmoid transformation of
x2.
pðx1 ¼1Þ¼ 11þ expðx2Þ (1)
Given trial-wise responses of participants that indicated
whether they had followed the advice implicit in the gaze, thisFig. 2 e Example of participant-specific learning trajectories for b
in terms of the non-social cue and B) prediction error d1gaze(blue
Variance (uncertainty) of prediction about non-social cue bs1card
posterior expectation of the blue card to be correct. The true tri
green correct ¼ 0) are shown in dark red dots and the response
shown in light red dots. F) The blue trajectory shows the poste
trial outcomes with respect to the gaze (correct ¼ 1; incorrect ¼
respect to the gaze (follow ¼ 1; not follow ¼ 0) are shown in ligmodel was inverted in order to infer participant-specific pa-
rameters and belief trajectories (Mathys et al., 2014). This
resulted in belief trajectories at three hierarchical levels i ¼
1;2; 3. The beliefs mðkÞi about the state of the environment are
updated on every trial k via prediction errors dðkÞi1 from the level
below weighted by a precision ratio (Equations 2-4) where the
beliefs’ precision pðkÞi on each level is equal to the inverse
variance of the belief pðkÞi ¼ 1=sðkÞi . Thus, the precision ratio
causes larger belief updates when the precision of the poste-































The evolution of beliefs is governed by participant-specific
parameters: u2card and u2gazedetermine the participant-specific
evolution rate at the second level. As such, they describe how
fast contingencies of gaze and card stimuli with outcome
change in general, independent of phasic spikes and dips.
u3card and u3gazeplay the corresponding role at the third level,
representing the evolution rates of the volatilities of theoth cues. A) Prediction error d1card (red) about trial outcome
) about the trial outcome in terms of the social cue. C)
and D) social cue bs1gaze:E) The red trajectory shows the
al outcomes with respect to the blue card (blue correct ¼ 1;
s with respect to the card (blue card ¼ 1; green card ¼ 0)
rior expectation of the social advice to be correct. The true
0) are shown in dark blue dots and the responses with
ht blue dots. Green dots marked missed trials.
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6226contingencies. Refer to table A2 in the appendix for configu-
rations of priors used in parameter estimation.
Perceptual model 2 is a parallel (gaze and card) version of
the Sutton K1 model which assumes a learning rate that
varies over time as a function of recent prediction errors
(Sutton, 1992). Perceptual model 3 is a parallel classical
reinforcement learning model which assumes a learning rate
that is fixed and participant-specific (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972).
2.3.2. Response models
In all response models, a combination of first level predictive
beliefs about gaze bmðtÞ1;gazeand card bmðtÞ1;cardcontingency with
outcome (called ‘accuracy’ in what follows), weighted by
precision was mapped onto decisions (Equation (5)). The
combined belief was modelled as the sum of the posterior
predictive expectation of gaze accuracy bmðtÞ1;gaze and card accu-
racy bmðtÞ1;card weighted by weights wðtÞgaze and wðtÞcard (Equations (6)
and (7)), which are a function of the precisions of gaze and
card accuracy predictions, respectively. Since beliefs were
modelled in the gaze space (i.e., all cues and outcomes were
parameterizedwith respect to the card receiving the gaze), the
posterior predictive expectation of card bmðtÞ1;card was translated
into gaze space, so that bmðtÞ1;card ¼ bmðtÞ1;card if the gaze went to the
blue card, but bmðtÞ1;card ¼ 1 bmðtÞ1;card if the gaze went to the green
card. The precisions bp1 (Equations (8) and (9)) were calculated
as the inverse variances of a Bernoulli distribution of the
posterior card and gaze estimates at the first level of the hi-
erarchy. This entails that precision increases when bmðtÞ1 moves
away from .5. The constant parameter z> 0 is a weight on the
precision of gaze accuracy representing the relative sensitivity
of a participant to the social input compared to the non-socialFig. 3 e Simulation for an agent with same perceptual paramete
different probability trajectories for taking the advice (p (y ¼ 1 | b
lowest values (log(-5) coded in light colours) and B) different pro
varying z values (highest values (log(5) coded in blue, lowest va
gaze (1¼ correct; 0¼ incorrect) is shown in blue in A) and the inp
in green in B).input. Simulations reported in Fig. 3 illustrate the implications
of high and low z values for decision-making.
bðtÞ ¼wðtÞgazebmðtÞ1;gaze þwðtÞcardbmðtÞ1;card (5)
wðtÞgaze ¼
zbpðtÞ1;gaze
zbpðtÞ1;gaze þ bpðtÞ1;card (6)
wðtÞcard ¼
bpðtÞ1;card









We coded participants’ responses y in terms of congruency
with the ‘advice’, that is, whether participants chose the card
that was indicated by the gaze shift (1) or not (0). In the
responsemodel, the probability of following the advice ProbðtÞgaze
was modelled as a logistic sigmoid (softmax) function of
combined belief bðtÞ (Equation (5)), weighted by the expected
reward of the card when following the advice rgazeor not rnotgaze
(Equation (10)).











The extent to which a participant’s beliefs map onto ac-
tions is dependent on inverse decision temperature gðtÞ. A
larger gðtÞimplies a more deterministic relationship between
actions and belief whereas a smaller gðtÞ is indicative of ars but different social cue weighting. The plot shows A) the
) with varying z values (highest values (log(5) coded in blue,
bability trajectories for taking the blue card (p(y ¼ 1 |b) with
lues (log(-5) coded in light colours). The actual input of the
ut of the card on a given trial (1¼ blue; 0¼ green) is shown
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6 227weaker relationship andmore erratic or stochastic behaviour.
We implemented four different versions of gðtÞ to test different
hypotheses (mechanisms) of belief-to-response mapping. We
inverted models in which gðtÞ was either (1) a combination of
the log-volatility of the third level for both gaze and card
combined with constant participant-specific decision noise b
(Equation (11)), (2) a combination of the log-volatility of the
third level for gaze and participant-specific decision noise
(Equation (12)), (3) a combination of the log-volatility of the
third level for card and participant-specific decision noise





















4Þ gðtÞ ¼b (14)
2.3.3. Combination of perceptual and response models
Overall, we used six different models to model learning and
decision-making: the HGF was combined with all four
responsemodels. Due to the lack of a third level, the Sutton K1
and Rescorla Wagner models were only combined with the
response model 4 in which decision noise was a participant-
specific decision noise parameter (Equation (14)). We used
the HGF toolbox version 4.1, which is part of the software
package TAPAS (https://translationalneuromodeling.github.
io/tapas). A quasi-Newton optimization algorithm was
employed for estimation.
2.4. Model selection
For model comparison we used the log model evidence (LME),
which is calculated in the HGF Toolbox during estimation and
represents a trade-off between model complexity and model
fit. The LME values for each of the 6 model configurations for
each participant were subjected to random-effects Bayesian
Model Selection (spm_BMS in SPM12; www.fil.ion.ucl.uk/spm)
to find the expected posterior probabilities (EXP_P), i.e., the
probability for each model of it having generated the re-
sponses for a randomly chosen participant out of all models in
the model space. We also report the exceedance probability
(XP) and protected exceedance probability (PXP), i.e., the
probability that a given model better explains the data than
any other model in the comparison space (Rigoux, Stephan,
Friston, & Daunizeau, 2014; Stephan, Penny, Daunizeau,
Moran, & Friston, 2009).
2.5. Behavioural analysis
As a proof-of-concept analysis for our computational
parameter z (i.e., the weighting of gaze input), we correlatedthis parameter with subjective reports given in a post-
experimental questionnaire, asking participants how much
they used the gaze (on a scale from 0 to 100) and howmuch it
had helped them during the task (on a scale from 0 to 100).
Also, we tested the association with the parameter z and the
percentage of trials in which a participant chose the card that
had been indicated by the gaze. In addition, advice taking
behaviour (card chosen indicated by gaze) was subjected to a
repeated measures ANOVA with Task Phase as within-
subject factor (gaze accuracy high vs gaze accuracy volatile
vs gaze accuracy low) and z as covariate. Statistical tests were
performed using JASP (Version .9; https://jasp-stats.org/) and
Matlab (Version 2018a; www.mathworks.com).2.6. fMRI acquisition and preprocessing
fMRI data were acquired with a 3-T MR imaging system
(MR750, GE, Milwaukee, USA) using a 32-channel head coil.
Anatomical screening was performed acquiring T1-weighted
3D inversion recovery fast spoiled gradient-echo scans with
a voxel size of 1  1  1 mm. Whole brain functional images
were acquired (AC-PC-orientation, interleaved bottom-up,
slice number ¼ 40, inter-slice gap ¼ .5 mm, TE ¼ 20 msec,
TR ¼ 2000 msec, flip angle ¼ 90, voxel size ¼ 3  3  3 mm,
FOV 24  24 cm, matrix 96  96, resulting in-plane resolution
4  4 mm). Each run lasted approximately 30 min, resulting in
around 900 volumes.
Preprocessing of fMRI data was performed using MATLAB
and SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping Software, www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Slice time correction was applied to ac-
count for the order of initially acquired interleaved slices.
Using rigid body transformation, images were then spatially
realigned to the volume mean and 6 motion regressors were
obtained, which were later used as nuisance regressors in the
GLM. The participant’s structural scan was then co-registered
to the volume mean. The co-registered structural image was
segmented and parameters obtained by this process were
applied for normalising functional and structural images to
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard template
with a voxel resolution of 2  2  2 mm for functional images
and 1 1 1mm for structural images. In addition, to account
for respiratory, cardiac, or vascular activity, a CompCor
analysis was performed using the PhysIOtoolbox (Kasper
et al., 2017; https://translationalneuromodeling.github.io/
tapas). Using this method, time courses of voxels within WM
and CSF (masks obtained from segmentation) were extracted
from the smoothed images and subjected to a principal
components analysis. The first three principal components of
both WM and CSF entered the GLM as nuisance regressors as
well as six movement parameters generated by the realign-
ment step. For each nuisance regressor, we also included the
absolute first order derivate. Due to losing the structural scan
of one subject when transferring data (after preprocessing),
the GLM of one participant only contained the twelve motion
nuisance regressors,without the principal components ofWM
and CSF.
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2.7.1. First-level
In our neuroimaging analysis we investigated the neural cor-
relates of the following computational trajectories: The belief
about the probability of the gaze to give correct advice (bmðtÞ1;gaze),
the variance (i.e., uncertainty) of this belief (bsðtÞ1;gaze), and the
variance about the probability of the winning card colour
(bsðtÞ1;card). We did not use bmðtÞ1;card in the analysis since we didn’t
expect neural activity with regard to the winning probability
of the blue or green card (the coding of blue ¼ 1 and green ¼ 0
was arbitrary). In addition, we investigated the neural corre-
lates of the social prediction error signal dðtÞ1gaze and the non-
social prediction error signal dðtÞ1card (an example of these tra-
jectories can be seen in Fig. 2).
In order to investigate whether neural activity change was
associated with these parameters, we defined voxel-wise
general linear models (GLMs) on the first level of analysis. In
the main GLM analysis the choice phase was modelled start-
ing from the time point of the gaze shift until the response of
the participant. The choice phase was parametrically modu-
lated with the participant-specific belief trajectories bmðtÞ1;gaze.
The outcome phase of the task (modelled for 2 sec starting at
outcome presentation) was parametrically modulated by four
regressors: The first regressor contained dðtÞ1gaze neutralised,
where the choicewaswrong by setting the regressor’s value to
zero. In the second regressor, dðtÞ1gaze was set to zero where the
choice was correct. This way we could evaluate dðtÞ1gaze for
wrong, correct, and all choices. This was important since the
surprise about the social cue has a different relevance
depending on whether the participant’s choice was correct or
wrong. Therefore, misleading advice that preceded a correct
choice might be differently valenced than misleading advice
that preceded a wrong choice. According to the same ratio-
nale, the third and fourth regressors contained
dðtÞ1card
neutralized where the gaze was correct and where it was
incorrect, respectively. The absolute value of prediction error
was chosen because it was an arbitrary choice whether to
code blue outcomes as 1 and green ones as 0 or the other way
around. In this analysis, we also examined the prediction
error signal for all trials, irrespective of social cue accuracy
and separately for trials in which the social cue was correct or
wrong. Due to a correlation between bmðtÞ1;gaze and bsðtÞ1;gaze, we
estimated bsðtÞ1;gaze and bsðtÞ1;card in a separate GLM, which was the
same as the one described above but differed in that the
choice phase was modulated by bsðtÞ1;gaze and bsðtÞ1;card and not by
bmðtÞ1;gaze. For completeness, we also estimated a GLM that
included all parametric regressors (bmðtÞ1;gaze, bsðtÞ1;gaze and bsðtÞ1;cardÞ as
modulators of the choice phase (cf. appendix).
To investigate the neural correlates of fixations (see
Methods, section 2.8 for acquisition and analysis) on the face
during choice, we defined another GLM, in which the choice
regressor was parametrically modulated by the fixation pro-
portions on the face area. This GLM was estimated for 44participants, as some participants had to be discarded due to
insufficient quality of the eye tracking data (i.e., blurred
corneal reflection).
In all GLMs, we modelled missed responses with separate
regressors and all regressors were convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic function. In addition, all parametric regressors
were z-scored and not orthogonalized.
2.7.2. Second-level
Contrast images for each parametric modulator were esti-
mated at the first level against baseline. These contrast im-
ages were entered into a second level one-sample t-test for
group level inference and we examined positive and negative
effects of the contrasts. We also compared positive ðdðtÞ1gaze >0,
i.e., gaze helpful) and negative social prediction errors
(dðtÞ1gaze <0, i.e., gaze misleading) directly, by entering subject-
wise pairs of positive and negative contrast images of the
parametric modulator containing the prediction error signal
d
ðtÞ
1gaze into a paired t-test. We also directly compared negative
social prediction errors during incorrect outcomes (i.e.,
participant followed misleading gaze) with negative social
prediction errors during correct outcomes (i.e., participant
didn’t follow misleading gaze) as well as positive social pre-
diction errors during correct outcomes (i.e., participant fol-
lowed helpful gaze) with positive social prediction errors
during incorrect outcomes (i.e., participant didn’t follow
helpful gaze).
To examine individual differences in brain areas associ-
ated with bmðtÞ1;gaze, we included the social weighting factor
zestimated from the winning computational model as a
variable of interest in the respective t-tests. As a non-
computational equivalent, we used the subjective report of
the post-experimental questionnaires (Tab. A1), stating the
extent to which participants used the gaze during the task.
In this analysis, we included 48 participants since the data
of two participants was missing (Tab. A1). Since zand the
post-experimental questionnaire were correlated (Fig. 2a),
these two were entered separately in the second level
analysis. To examine individual differences in brain regions
correlated with -bsðtÞ1;card as a function of weighting the non-
social cue, we used z for the computational covariate and
Question3 for the questionnaire covariate. Clusters were
formed at uncorrected p ¼ .001, followed by a cluster-level
correction for multiple testing, with significance defined as
cluster-level p-values < .05 after correction for family-wise
error rate (FWE).
2.8. Eyetracking data acquisition and analysis
Eye movement data was acquired employing an infrared
pupil-corneal reflection-based eye-tracking system (Eyelink
1000 Plus, SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada), which was
connected to an MR compatible fibre-optic camera head. The
camera head consisted of a 75 mm lens and an MR-
compatible LED Illuminator. A first-surface reflecting mirror
was attached to the scanner head coil to reflect participants’
eye movements. The distance between mirror and eye-
tracker was 125 cm and the distance between eyes and
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6 229monitor was 240 cm. We used a nine-point calibration to map
the gaze position onto screen coordinates and we acquired
data using a sampling rate of 2000 Hz. Preprocessing of eye
tracking data was performed using Matlab (Version 2017a;
www.mathworks.com). We segmented fixations during the
choice phase starting from the point of the advice until the
response of the participant. We also calculated mean fixation
points during the inter-trial interval (ITI). Due to the long
operating distance between eyes and monitor in the scanner,
we observed a shift in fixation data, which was different for
all participants. We calculated a shift distance in the x and y
coordinates for each participant by subtracting the mean
measured fixation points during the ITI’s from the co-
ordinates of the fixation cross that was presented during the
ITI. This shift value for both coordinates was then applied to
the segmented fixation points of the decision and outcome
phase.
In order to investigate the relationship between z and the
gaze data further, we used a general linear model approach
similar to the one employed in the fMRI analyses: We created
participant-specific fixation heatmaps for each trial
(768  1024  120) for the choice phase as well as for the
outcome phase. When generating the heatmaps, we
smoothed the fixation maps using a Gaussian kernel with mu
of fixation’s Cartesian coordinate and SD of 1 corresponding
to a full-width-at-half-maximum of approximately 2.35
(Lahnakoski et al., 2014). We further defined pixel-wise GLMs
to analyse those regions of the screen where the number of
fixations correlate with the social weighting factor z.
Furthermore, in order to incorporate fixation data into our
GLM model, we calculated the proportion of face fixations
during the decision phase. For this, we counted fixation points
falling onto the region of the screen where the face was pre-
sented and fixation points falling on all remaining parts of the
screen. We then divided the number of fixations points from
the rest of the screen by the number of fixation points falling
on the face. In all eye-tracking analyses, 6 participants had to
be discarded from further analysis due to blurred corneal
reflection signals.3. Results
3.1. Bayesian model comparison & selection
Random effects BMS revealed a clear superiority for the three-
level HGF in combination with a response model in which
decision noise is a combination of the log-volatility for both
gaze and card combined with participant-specific log-vola-
tility for card bm3;card and participant-specific decision noise b
(XP ¼ .937; PXP ¼ .627; EXP_P ¼ .464; Table 1). Therefore, weTable 1 e Bayesian model selection results. Posterior model pro
(PXP).
Model 1 Model 2 Model
EXP_R .464 .098 .077
PXP .627 .067 .067
XP .937 0 0used this model for all subsequent analyses. Mean parameter
estimates can be seen in the appendix (Tab A. 3).
3.2. Simulations
While keeping the perceptual model parameters fixed at the
prior values, we simulated inferred choice probabilities (in
gaze space (Equation (10)) and in card space) of agents with
variable z values to investigate how this parameter will affect
choice probabilities with regard to the social information
(Fig. 3A) and the non-social information (Fig. 3B) respectively.
The simulations show that z represents a relative sensitivity
parameter for the social input over the non-social input such
that high z values mean that the integrated belief is charac-
terized by an increased sensitivity of the social information
(gaze correct vs gaze wrong) and at the same time a decreased
sensitivity, i.e., increased stochasticity, with regard to the
non-social information (blue card vs green card correct).
3.3. Behavioural statistics: advice-taking & fixation
behaviour
We found that the social weighting factor z was significantly
correlated with subjective reports of having used the gaze
during the task [rs(48)¼ .453, p¼ .001] and the subjective report
of finding the gaze helpful [rs(48) ¼ .292, p ¼ .044] (Fig. 4A and
B). The social weighting factor zwas positively correlatedwith
the proportion of trials in which the gaze was followed [rs
(48) ¼ .487, p < .001] (Fig. 4C). The same was the case for the
subjective report of using the gaze [rs (48) ¼ .449, p ¼ .001].
Furthermore, when looking at advice-taking behaviour, the
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of task
phase [F(2,96) ¼ 57.050, p < .001, h2 ¼ .543] showing that par-
ticipants’ advice-taking behaviour varied with the probability
by which the gaze was giving a helpful advice. Post-hoc t-tests
showed that participants followed the advice significantly
more often in the high-accuracy phase (80%) compared to the
volatile phase [t(50) ¼ 7.357, p < .001, d ¼ 1.04]. During the low-
accuracy phase (20%) participants chose the advice signifi-
cantly less compared to the volatile [t(50) ¼ 2.911, p ¼ .016,
d ¼ .41] and compared to the high accuracy phase
[t(50)¼ 8.340, p< .001, d¼ 1.179]. Therewas amain effect of the
covariate z [F(1,48)¼ 17.54, p < .001, h2 ¼ .268] and a significant
interaction between the covariate z and the magnitude of the
effect of task phase on behaviour [F(2,96) ¼ 6.832, p ¼ .002,
h2 ¼ .125] indicating that participants with a higher z are more
sensitive to the social cue probability. Furthermore, the GLM
analysis of the fixation data revealed that fixation points
falling on the face area of the social stimulus (p < .001, un-
corrected) during choice phase were significantly correlated
with z (Fig. 4D).babilities (EXP_R) and protected exceedance probabilities




Fig. 4 e A) Association between estimated values of computational parameter z and subjective reports of having used the
gaze and B) finding it helpful during decision-making. C) Association between z and % of trials where gaze was followed. D)
Mean proportion of fixations on face area during all trials and z; Pixel-wise analysis of smoothed fixation data revealed that
z is correlated with the time people spend looking at the face (p < .001, uncorrected) during the choice phase of the trials.
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3.4.1. Social and non-social prediction and precision during
decision-making
During the choice phase of the task, the subjective predicted
advice accuracy bmðtÞ1;gaze correlated with activity in the right and
left inferior temporal gyri, left and right inferior parietal
lobule, left and right precentral gyri, right postcentral gyrus,
left and right superior frontal gyrus, left and right fusiform
gyri, and the right putamen, superior orbital gyrus and pal-
lidum (Fig. 5 and Table 2). Self-reports of having used the gaze
during decision-making were associated with higher activity
related to bmðtÞ1;gazein the right rectal gyrus, right and left puta-
men and insula (Fig. 6 and Table 3) across participants. Dif-
ferences in activation strength as a function of z were
associated with activity in the right inferior occipital gyrus
(Table A4). Significant clusters were neither found for the
correlation with 1 bmðtÞ1;gaze (the subjective predicted probabil-
ity of a misleading gaze) nor for the variance of the prediction
bsðtÞ1;gaze and 1 bsðtÞ1;gaze. Results for bmðtÞ1;gaze when estimated
together with bsðtÞ1;gaze and bsðtÞ1;card in one GLM can be seen in Table
A5 & A6.
In the choice phase of the task, the negative contrast on
the variance of the belief about the winning card colour (1-
bsðtÞ1;card) correlated with the right insula and right rolandicFig. 5 e fMRI results for predicted accuracy of advice (bmðtÞ1;gaze) duri
p < .001, cluster-level threshold p < .05, FWE corrected. [x y z] c
slices. See Table 2 for further information on cluster extents anoperculum (Fig. 7 and Table 4). Neither thez (computational
non-social weight) nor e Question3 (subjective non-social
weight), were correlated with brain activity related to1-
bsðtÞ1;card. No significant clusters were found for the positive
contrast ðbsðtÞ1;cardÞ.3.4.2. Social and non-social prediction error during outcome
For negative social prediction errors (dðtÞ1gaze <0, i.e., gaze
misleading) during wrong choice outcomes, we observed sig-
nificant activations in the right inferior frontal gyrus, right
insula, rolandic operculum and left posterior medial frontal
gyrus (Fig. 8 and Table 5). No significant activations were
found for negative social prediction errors during correct
choice outcomes or when evaluating both correct and wrong
choices. The analyses looking at the positive prediction error
signals (dðtÞ1gaze >0, i.e., gaze helpful) revealed significant acti-
vations in the right lingual gyrus and middle occipital gyrus,
but only in correct choice outcomes (Table 6).
When we directly compared negative prediction errors
during incorrect outcomes against negative prediction errors
during correct outcomes we found the same activation in the
right insula, rolandic operculum and left posterior medial
frontal gyrus as when evaluating negative social prediction
errors against baseline during incorrect outcomes. When we
directly compared positive prediction error signals duringng the choice phase of the task. Cluster-forming threshold:
oordinates refer to the MNI coordinates of the respective
d peak voxel coordinates.
Table 2 e fMRI results for predicted accuracy of advice
(bmðtÞ1:gaze) during the choice phase.
Region (left/right) Pcluster Cluster MNI
coordinates
k Tpeak x y z
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 0 1749 7.9 52 60 6
R Fusiform Gyrus 4.14 40 72 18
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 4.01 50 82 4
L SupraMarginal Gyrus 0 1057 6.25 58 24 36
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 4.4 54 36 50
R Precentral Gyrus 0 4401 6.15 58 10 30
L Precentral Gyrus 5.32 34 10 58
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 5.14 26 6 68
L Posterior-Medial Frontal 4.8 8 4 68
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 4.75 22 8 72
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 4.74 34 42 50
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 4.73 20 4 72
R Postcentral Gyrus 0 1424 5.91 54 22 34
R SupraMarginal Gyrus 5.62 62 16 28
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 4.03 44 34 48
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus .001 524 5.77 50 68 8
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 3.29 56 58 2
White Matter .004 421 5.04 16 6 12
R Putamen 4.32 18 14 10
R Pallidum 4.08 22 2 0
R Superior Orbital Gyrus 3.95 18 22 18
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus .028 274 4.39 40 28 26
L Fusiform Gyrus 4.23 38 32 28
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 4.21 44 24 20
L Cerebellum (VI) 3.93 32 40 28
Table 3 e Neural correlates of differential responses to
bmðtÞ1:gazeas a function of the subjective report of having used
the gaze during decision making.
Region
(left/right)
Pcluster Cluster MNI coordinates
k Tpeak x y z
L Insula Lobe 281 281 4.78 26 12 16
L Putamen 4.04 22 16 0
R Rectal Gyrus 234 234 4.65 20 18 12
R Putamen 3.83 30 10 0
R Insula Lobe 3.36 36 6 12
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6 231correct outcomes against positive prediction errors during
incorrect outcomes, we also found the same activation in the
right lingual gyrus and middle occipital gyrus as when eval-
uating positive social prediction errors against baseline during
correct outcomes.
Comparing negative with positive social prediction errors,
we found the same activation in the right inferior frontal
gyrus, right insula, rolandic operculum and left posterior
medial frontal gyrus but only when evaluating incorrectFig. 6 e The contrast in the left shows brain areas showing diff
report of having used the gaze during decision-making. The righ
and the highest peak in the insula. Cluster-forming threshold: p
coordinate refer to the MNI coordinate of the respective slice. See
voxel coordinates.outcomes. The activation was found in the same regions as
when evaluating negative social prediction errors against
baseline during wrong outcomes.
Next, we looked at the absolute prediction error of the
advice (dðtÞ1card), signalling the surprise about the cue colour.
When the social cuewas correct, we found significant bilateral
activations in the posterior medial frontal gyri, anterior and
middle cingulate cortex and insula (Fig. 9, Table 7). When
looking at the modulation of dðtÞ1card during all outcomes irre-
spective of advice accuracy, only the cluster in the posterior-
medial, superior frontal gyrus and middle cingulate cortex
and the cluster in the left insula was significant (Table 7).
When the social cue was incorrect, no significant clusters
were found for dðtÞ1card. The results for the negative contrast on
d
ðtÞ
1card looking at activity correlated with a decrease in surprise
about the winning card colour can be seen in Table A. 7.4. Discussion
In this study, we usedmodel-based fMRI to uncover the neural
mechanisms of inference on social and non-social cues during
a probabilistic learning task using a three-level hierarchical
Bayesian model describing parallel learning. Furthermore, we
assessed individual differences in the relative weight granted
to social over non-social information during the task anderential responses to bmðtÞ1;gazeas a function of the subjective
t plot depicts the correlation between the subjective report
< .001, cluster-level threshold p < .05, FWE corrected. The Y
Table 3 for further information on cluster extents and peak
Fig. 7 e Significant clusters for the negative contrast of the variance of the prediction of the winning card colour (bsðtÞ1;card)
during the choice phase of the task. Cluster-forming threshold: p < .001 uncorrected, cluster-level threshold p < .05, FWE
corrected. [x y z] coordinates refer to the MNI coordinates of the respective slices. See Table 4 for further information on
cluster extents and peak voxel coordinates.
Table 4 e fMRI results for the negative contrast on the
predicted variance of the winning card colour bsðtÞ1:cardduring
the choice phase.
Region (left/right) Pcluster Cluster MNI coordinates
k Tpeak x y z
R Insula Lobe .003 381 5.51 36 6 10
R Rolandic
Operculum
4.68 46 2 14
Table 5 e fMRI results for negative social prediction error
(dðtÞ1gaze <0: i.e., gaze misleading) during wrong choices.
Region (left/right) Pcluster Cluster MNI
coordinates
k Tpeak x y z
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus
(p. Orbitalis)
0 769 5.9 36 32 4
R Insula Lobe 4.95 36 22 4
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus
(p. Triangularis)
4.82 50 28 2
R Rolandic Operculum 3.84 52 8 4
L Posterior-Medial
Frontal Gyrus
.009 312 4.87 0 4 64
Table 6 e fMRI results for positive social prediction error
(dðtÞ1gaze >0: i.e., gaze helpful) during correct choices.
Region (left/right) Pcluster Cluster MNI coordinates
k Tpeak x y z
R Lingual Gyrus 499 4.59 14 98 8
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 3.66 36 96 0
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6232demonstrated that the estimated values of the corresponding
parameter accord with model-agnostic equivalents such as
subjective reports and eye gaze behaviour during the task. In
addition, we showed that the weight on social information
during decision-making correlates with individual differences
in brain activation during decision-making, in particular in
the putamen and insula.
4.1. Social and non-social prediction error activations
Negative social prediction errors (dðtÞ1gaze < 0, i.e., gaze
misleading) during wrong choices recruited the right anterior
insula, as well as the right inferior frontal gyrus and the left
posterior-medial frontal gyrus. For correct choices these ac-
tivations were absent, suggesting that the deception of theFig. 8 e Neural correlates of (dðtÞ1gaze) during wrong choice outcomes. The negative contrast on the parametric modulator of the
outcome phase reflects BOLD activity in regions correlated with negative social prediction errors. Cluster-forming threshold:
p < .001, cluster-level threshold p < .05, FWE corrected. [x y z] coordinates refer to the MNI coordinates of the respective
slices. See Table 5 for further information on cluster extents and peak voxel coordinates.
Fig. 9 e Neural correlates of absolute learning signal (dðtÞ1card). The positive contrast on the parametric modulator reflects BOLD
activity in regions correlated with amount of surprise about the accuracy of the card colour when social cue was correct.
Cluster-forming threshold: p < .001, cluster-level threshold p < .05, FWE corrected. [x y z] coordinates refer to the MNI
coordinates of the respective slices. See Table 7 for further information on cluster extents and peak voxel coordinates.
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6 233social cue was not relevant when participants succeeded in
selecting the winning card on a given trial.
Activation in the anterior insula in response to negative
social prediction errors is in line with insula activity in
response to misleading advice in a previous study of explicit
mentalizing (Diaconescu et al., 2017), as well as unrec-
iprocated cooperation in the trust game (King-Casas et al.,
2008; Rilling et al., 2008), social exclusion (Eisenberger
et al., 2003) and to (negative) surprise about the expected
offer of a confederate in a fairness game (Xiang, Lohrenz, &
Montague, 2013). These findings support the notion that the
anterior insula plays an important role in tracking risk in
uncertain environments (Bossaerts, 2010; d’Acremont, Lu,Table 7 e fMRI results for
dðtÞ1card during outcome phases
where advice was correct.
Region (left/right) Pcluster Cluster MNI
coordinates
k Tpeak x y z
Advice correct
L Insula Lobe 0 568 5.54 42 14 2
R Middle Cingulate
Cortex
0 1020 5.39 8 20 38
L Posterior-Medial
Frontal Gyrus
5.24 4 12 48
L Middle Cingulate
Cortex
5.1 2 20 38
R Posterior-Medial
Frontal
4.1 8 8 54
R Anterior Cingulate
Cortex
3.78 6 30 26
L Anterior Cingulate
Cortex
3.55 2 38 26
R Inferior Frontal
Gyrus (p. Orbitalis)
.002 422 5.32 34 24 8
R Insula Lobe 5.16 42 18 4
All outcomes
L Insula Lobe .032 225 5.11 44 12 4
L Posterior-Medial
Frontal Gyrus
.001 492 4.81 4 12 48
R Superior Frontal
Gyrus
4.08 14 4 74
R Middle Cingulate
Cortex
3.79 8 20 36Li, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2009). In particular, the
right anterior insula has been found to be involved in the
integration of (arousing) interoceptive states into decision-
making, potentially by signalling aversive events that are
to be avoided in the future (Rilling et al., 2008). In our study,
participants did not know if and to what extent the social
cue will provide them helpful or misleading advice. The
activity in the insula and inferior frontal gyrus to negative
social prediction errors (i.e., misleading advice) was only
observed in trials in which participants did not receive the
reward. In other words, the insula/inferior frontal gyrus
activation signalled occasions where the participant should
not have followed the gaze.
We also found significant correlations with non-social
prediction errors dðtÞ1card in the left and right insula, a pattern
resembling prediction error activation in a sensory learning
paradigm (Iglesias, Mathys, Brodersen, Kasper, Piccirelli,
denOuden, et al., 2013), which underlines the insula’s role in
error monitoring irrespective of the domain of learning
(Diaconescu et al., 2017).
For positive social prediction errors (gaze more helpful
than predicted) during correct outcomes, we found activity in
the right occipital and lingual gyrus but not in reward-
associated areas as reported by others (Biele, Rieskamp,
Krugel, & Heekeren, 2011; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005;
Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2012; Fouragnan et al., 2013). This
may reflect the directing of visual attention towards relevant,
in our case, social stimuli. Indeed, reward learning signals
were previously also found in the occipital cortex by Payzan-
LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, and O’Doherty (2013).
In the present study, social prediction errors did not
significantly activate brain regions that have been associated
with mentalization, such as the TPJ or the dmPFC (Behrens
et al., 2008; Diaconescu et al., 2017; Koster-Hale et al., 2017)
or that have been associated with observational learning such
as the ACCg (Apps et al., 2016, 2015; Lockwood et al., 2015). A
crucial difference between the present and other social
learning studies is that our study did not involve instruction
with respect to an opponent or confederate. Instead, we
merely presented the computer-generated face because we
wanted to investigate the spontaneous integration of social
information into decision making. Indeed, a subgroup of our
participants claimed not to have used the social information
c o r t e x 1 3 1 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 2 2 1e2 3 6234during the task. Possibly, these participants concentrated
more on the non-social feedback to predict the outcome,
relying less on social feedback to adapt their behaviour, thus
reducing statistical power to detect effects of social inference
in the group analysis.
4.2. Social and non-social prediction and precision
We found that the belief about the social cue, i.e., the inferred
probability of the gaze to give a correct advice (bmðtÞ1;gaze), was
associated with activity in the inferior temporal gyri, inferior
and superior parietal lobule as well as parts of the striatum
including the right putamen and pallidum. The striatum’s
involvement in tracking the belief about the accuracy of social
advice during choice accords with earlier findings regarding
the role of this region in encoding the value of social inter-
action partners (Baez-Mendoza & Schultz, 2013; Baumgartner,
Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008; Delgado
et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2008) and of
the non-social aspects of a learning environment (cf.
O’Doherty, 2004).
The present results suggest that the magnitude of BOLD
activity related to advice accuracy in the putamen and ante-
rior insula may be modulated as a function of individual dif-
ferences in employing the social cue during decision-making.
Specifically, the recruitment of the putamen and insula was
more pronounced for participants that integrated the social
cue into their decision-making, as indicated by subjective re-
ports. Activity changes in the insula that correlate with advice
accuracy during choice are in line with a previous finding of
insula activity correlating with the predicted value of the ac-
tion of another person (Apps et al., 2015).
Our finding that putamen and insula activities were
correlated with increased weighting of social information
needs to be seen in light of a limitation of the current study:
we did not have a non-social control condition, for instance in
form of an arrow pointing to one of the cards. Therefore, we
cannot fully determine whether individual differences in so-
cial cue weighting associated with insula and putamen ac-
tivity can be attributed to purely social or more general
learning processes. In fact, co-activation of putamen and
insula has previously been found in non-social cueing tasks
(Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000). Remarkably how-
ever, these regions show significantly stronger activations for
directional gaze cues compared to arrows in a spatial cueing
task in healthy participants (Greene et al., 2011).
These findings raise the potential of our method for
studying aberrant social inference in psychiatric disorders
(Diaconescu, Hauke, & Borgwardt, 2019; Frith, 2004), which is
often associated with deficits in automatic but not explicit
integration of social cues (Callenmark, Kjellin, Ronnqvist, &
Bolte, 2014; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). Specif-
ically, patients with schizophrenia have a tendency to over-
attribute the meaning and salience of social signals
(Diaconescu et al., 2019; Frith, 2004). It would be interesting to
investigate whether this would be reflected in processing ab-
normalities in the insula and putamen.
Interestingly, while we found significant activations in the
right insula correlating negatively with uncertainty about thewinning card colour, we did not find differential activity in the
insula as a function of non-social cue weighting ( z). While
we did not find significant activations with regard to uncer-
tainty about the social cue, we found that fixation frequency
on the face during choice, which may in itself reflect the de-
gree of decision uncertainty (Brunye & Gardony, 2017), was
correlated with activations in the superior temporal gyrus (at
a less conservative statistical threshold, cf. appendix Tab A.5).
This is in line with this region’s role in mentalization and
suggests that these processes are triggered in the absence of
explicit instructions to mentalize.5. Conclusions
The present study used model-based fMRI to demonstrate
commonalities and differences in the neural mechanisms of
social and non-social cue integration during learning and
decision-making. While activations related to the non-social
cue were associated with activity change in the middle and
anterior cingulate and insula, negative social prediction errors
additionally extended into the inferior frontal gyrus. During
decision-making, tracking the uncertainty of the non-social
cue was associated with activity change in the insula, while
tracking the probabilistic accuracy of the social cue showed
activity in the inferior temporal gyrus, putamen and pallidum,
regions known for their relevance in reward-based process-
ing. The putamen and the insula showed activity as a function
of individual differences in weighting the social cue during
decision-making. Our findings demonstrate the usefulness of
model-based fMRI for the study of the spontaneous use of
social cues in learning and decision-making, and they provide
evidence for the involvement of specific components of the
basal ganglia in these processes.Funding
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